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The interactions between the legislature and the
judiciary in EU external relations
geert de baere and panos koutrakos
1 Introduction
This chapter explores the relationship between the judiciary and the leg-
islature within the external relations of the European Union. It does so
from two angles: on the one hand, it focuses on the interactions between
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the drafters of
the Treaties, the Union’s primary law, and, on the other hand, it exam-
ines the interactions between the Court and the legislature proper, that
is the institutions which adopt secondary legislation. In the context of
the Union’s external relations, this broad understanding of the term
‘legislature’ is necessary: the very genesis of this area of law owes its
existence to the Court’s creativity against the paucity of references to
external action in primary law; as for the central position of external rela-
tions in the current constitutional arrangements, it is due to the gradual
adjustment of the Treaties to the evolving legal landscape as shaped by
case law. The analysis is structured in two parts. The first part examines
the interactions between the judiciary and the masters of the Treaties
and analyses the manner in which the CJEU’s construction of the com-
mon commercial policy (CCP) and the Treaty drafters’ reactions to that
construction have moulded that policy into the bedrock of EU exter-
nal relations that it is today. It also assesses how the CJEU reacted to
the sparseness of explicit external relations competences in the original
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) by devis-
ing a doctrine of implied competences, which has been codified in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) after Lisbon.
The second part focuses on three specific areas of EU external relations
(investment, aviation, civil justice) and examines the procedural frame-
works which the legislature has introduced (or suggested) in response to
the Court’s case law on competence. It explores the implications of the
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legislature’s responses for the management of the external competence
of the Union, and the challenges these raise for both the Union and the
Member States.
2 The interaction between the masters of the Treaty and the
Court of Justice in EU external relations
The relationship between the judiciary and the legislature takes on a
singular character when it appears in the guise of the interaction between
the CJEU and the masters of the Treaty or the Treaty drafters, the ‘noms de
plume’ of the Member States. While the Court has the jurisdiction both to
interpret and to assess the validity of Union acts adopted on the basis of
the Treaties, its jurisdiction vis-a`-vis the Treaties themselves is limited to
interpretation. However, through its interpretation of Treaty norms, the
Court can significantly affect their application without the ‘legislature’, in
this case the Treaty drafters, being able to react easily. The cumbersome
procedure to amend the Treaties1 makes legislative ‘correction’ of the
Court’s interpretation of Treaty norms difficult and hence rare.2 Even
so, the interaction between the Court’s interpretation and the eventual
reaction by the Treaty drafters (through varying degrees of codification
and correction) to these evolving interpretations have at times gradually
but comprehensively shaped the external relations law of the EU.
That important role of the CJEU was partially the consequence of the
fact that the original EEC Treaty contained few express external relations
legal bases. It was, for example, clear from the outset that Article 9(1)
EEC3 on the customs union would have to be complemented by other
provisions on external relations if that customs union or the common
market was ever to work.4 These other provisions were to be found in the
chapter on the CCP.5 In particular, Article 113(1) EEC provided that, after
the expiry of a transitional period, the CCP was to be based on ‘uniform
principles, particularly in regard to tariff amendments, the conclusion of
tariff or trade agreements, the alignment of measures of liberalisation,
1 Presently laid down in Article 48 TEU.
2 Cf. K. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press,
2009), pp. 124–32.
3 Which became Article 23(1) EC and is now Article 28(1) TFEU.
4 Cf.M. Cremona, ‘The External Dimension of the Single Market: Building (on) the Founda-
tions’, in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking
the Premises (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2002), p. 351; P. Eeckhout, EU
External Relations Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2011), p. 12.
5 Articles 110–16 EEC, which became Articles 131–4 EC and are now Articles 206–7 TFEU.
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export policy and protective commercial measures including measures to
be taken in cases of dumping or subsidies’. The rest of Article 113 EEC
contained rather limited procedural provisions for the internal and exter-
nal implementation of the CCP. Significantly, the Court held ‘the proper
functioning of the customs union’ to justify ‘a wide interpretation of [inter
alia, Article 113 EEC] and of the powers which these provisions confer
on the institutions to allow them thoroughly to control external trade
by measures taken both independently and by agreement’.6 It is through
the interpretation of the Treaty provisions on the CCP in general, but of
the simultaneously terse and fundamental Article 113 EEC in particular,
that the CJEU shaped the CCP.
Furthermore, all the Articles in the EEC Treaty referring to external
relations specifically granted the Community a competence that could
only be exercised on the external plane, as opposed to external comple-
ments of internal competences.7 This implies that none of the core legal
bases in policy areas fundamental for the full articulation of the common
market were expressly equipped by the EEC Treaty with any possibility
for external action. Attempts to address this lack of explicit legal bases for
external action were made in two ways: by Treaty amendment and through
creative interpretation by the CJEU of the existing Treaty provisions, such
as to make a viable external policy in a number of areas possible. The latter
results in what is mostly referred to as ‘implied external competences’.
The interaction between the Court and the Treaty drafters as regards
the CCP and the doctrine of implied competences will now be examined
in turn.
2.1 The shaping of the common commercial policy
2.1.1 The foundations
The Court’s reaction to the not very helpful Article 113 EEC was to
define the CCP in a manner that was both wide and dynamic in Opinion
1/75. The Court held the concept of ‘commercial policy’ to have ‘the
same content whether it is applied in the context of the international
action of a state or to that of the Community’ and affirmed international
trade practice as a factor for determining the scope of the CCP,8 thereby
6 Case 8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey Ferguson [1973] ECR 897 at [4].
7 Cf. A. Dashwood, ‘The Attribution of External Relations Competence’, in A. Dashwood
and C. Hillion (eds.),The General Law of EC External Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
2000), p. 121.
8 Opinion 1/75 [OECD Local Cost Standard] [1975] ECR 1355, at 1362–3.
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confirming its essential flexibility and positioning itself as the ultimate
arbiter of that scope.9
However, the Court also held that the CCP ‘is conceived . . . in the con-
text of the operation of the Common Market, for the defence of the com-
mon interests of the Community, within which the particular interests
of the Member States must endeavour to adapt to each other’. The Court
took the view that this conception was incompatible with a concurrent
power for the Member States.10 The Court held that unilateral action by
the Member States would inevitably lead to disparities in the conditions
for the grant of export credits. This would distort competition between
undertakings of the various Member States in external markets. It would
also endanger the entire internal market structure of the Community.11
It does not follow necessarily from the fact that the Member States
would retain competences in external trade concurrently with the Com-
munity that they would not act in accordance with the Community’s com-
mon interest, though, of course, they could. The Court’s conclusion that
the Community was exclusively competent with regard to external trade
is nonetheless sound from a legal, political and economic perspective.12
Why, however, did the Court conclude that a priori exclusivity was neces-
sary for the CCP instead of relying on the ERTA principle, the application
of which leads to a competence becoming exclusive through the Com-
munity exercising it?13 In other words, why did the Court believe that it
needed to exclude a priori and in principle Member States’ competence
regardless of whether the Community’s competence in the CCP had been
exercised? The answer lies in the nature of the activity. It is impossible to
have a properly functioning single market if the Member States are free,
in the absence of legislation at the Union level, to enter into international
agreements with third countries. In Opinion 1/75, the Court based its
reasoning on the notion of ‘common interest of the Community’, which
leads to the question why this interest could not be sufficiently protected
by application of the ERTA principle. The Court could have made this
9 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 34.
10 Opinion 1/75, n8 above, at 1363–4.
11 See P. Eeckhout, The European Internal Market and International Trade: A Legal Analysis
(Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 186–246.
12 See Eeckhout, n4 above, at p. 17, pointing out that the Court could also have found
support in Article XXIV:(8)(a) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 UNTS 194;
61 Stat. pt. 5; TIAS 1700 (GATT(1947)).
13 Derived from Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (‘ERTA’) [1971] ECR 263. See further
below.
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question redundant by clearly spelling out the pragmatically convincing
argument that once the Community is a single market, it has to have an
exclusive CCP.14
The dynamic nature of the CCP was further elaborated in Opinion
1/78. There, the Court adapted the CCP to the fact that international
trade was increasingly based on regulation rather than pure liberalisa-
tion, holding that a more restricted CCP ‘would be destined to become
nugatory in the course of time’. Moreover, it explicitly referred to the
importance of the CCP for the internal market by holding that a restric-
tive interpretation of the concept of CCP would risk causing disturbances
in intra-Community trade by reason of the disparities which would
then exist in certain sectors of economic relations with non-member
countries.15 In Opinion 1/78, therefore, the Court proved that it was
serious about the dynamic nature of the CCP as expounded in Opin-
ion 1/75, and drew the conclusions from the evolution in external trade
regulation for the scope of the CCP.16 However, the Court equally dis-
played the necessary pragmatism. In Opinion 1/78, it reasoned that, if
the financing was to be done by the Member States, that would imply
their participation in the decision-making machinery or, at least, their
agreement with regard to the arrangements for financing envisaged and
consequently their participation in the agreement together with the Com-
munity. In that case, the competence of the Community could not be
exclusive.17 Furthermore, in Donckerwolke, while explicitly affirming the
link between the CCP and the common market, the Court also acknowl-
edged that the fact that at the expiry of the transitional period the CCP
was not fully achieved implied a flexible approach to the principle of
uniformity.18
2.1.2 From Maastricht via Opinion 1/94 to Amsterdam
During the negotiations leading up to the Maastricht Treaty and against
the background of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Commission had
14 G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford University Press,
2008), at pp. 41–2.
15 Opinion 1/78 [International Agreement on Natural Rubber] [1979] ECR 2871, at [43]–
[45].
16 See also Case 45/86 Commission v. Council [1987] ECR 1493, at [16]–[19].
17 Opinion 1/78, n15 above, at [60]. Compare, however, Opinion 1/94 [Competence of the
Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of
intellectual property] [1994] ECR I-5267, at [21].
18 Case 41/76 Donckerwolke and others v. Procureur de la Re´publique and Others [1976] ECR
1921, at [27]–[29].
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put forward very ambitious proposals for amendments to the Treaty in
the field of the CCP. These proposals included an extension of the CCP
(which was to be renamed ‘external economic policy’) to cover the external
aspects of trade in services, intellectual property, capital, investment,
establishment and competition policy. Significantly, the Commission took
the view that this was intended not as a change of the scope of the CCP,
but as a necessary codification of the Court’s case law, or at least of the
dynamic aspect of that case law. These proposals were, however, never
truly taken seriously by the Member States, which left the scope of the
CCP largely untouched except for services closely related to trade. By
the same token, their unwillingness to adopt the Commission’s proposed
codification of the Court’s case law showed the disagreement among the
Member States over the scope of that case law.
After the disappointment of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission
arguably attempted to achieve judicially what it had not been able to
achieve at the intergovernmental conference (IGC): the extension of the
CCP essentially to encompass all matters covered by the WTO Agreements
and more particularly all trade in services and all aspects of trade in intel-
lectual property rights contained in the TRIPS Agreement.19 The Com-
mission therefore requested an Opinion of the Court pursuant to Article
228(6) EC (now Article 218(11) TFEU) on whether or not the Commu-
nity had exclusive competence to conclude the Multilateral Agreements
on Trade in Goods, insofar as those Agreements concern ECSC products
and Euratom products. The Commission’s questions further related to
the exclusive competence the Community may enjoy by virtue of either
Article 113 EC, or the parallelism of internal and external competence, or
Articles 100a or 235 EC,20 to conclude GATS and TRIPS.21 The following
will focus on the contentious issues as regards the competence to conclude
GATS and TRIPS.
The Commission based its plea for exclusivity on the fact that in certain
developed countries the services sector had become the dominant sector
of the economy. The Court, however, drew from ‘this trend in interna-
tional trade’ and from the open nature of the CCP the more cautious
conclusion that trade in services could not ‘immediately, and as a matter
19 M. Cremona, ‘EC External Economic Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and Interpre-
tation within Interconnected Legal Orders’, in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO
and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (Oxford University Press,
2000), pp. 8–9.
20 Now Articles 114 and 352 TFEU, respectively. 21 Opinion 1/94, n17 above, at [1].
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of principle, be excluded from the scope of Article 113’. The Court then
relied specifically on Article I:(2) of GATS, according to which trade in
services is defined, for the purposes of that agreement, as comprising four
modes of supply of services. As regards cross-frontier supplies (mode 1),
the Court held that because neither the supplier nor the consumer move
to the other’s country, that situation was not unlike trade in goods, which
was unquestionably covered by the CCP. There was thus no particular
reason why such a supply should not fall within the CCP. However, the
Court excluded from the CCP the other three modes of supply of services
covered by GATS, namely, consumption abroad, commercial presence
and the presence of natural persons.22 As regards TRIPS, the Court was
concerned that an exclusive competence to conclude the agreement might
distort the internal institutional balance. It noted that, since TRIPS lays
down rules in fields in which there were no Community harmonisation
measures, its conclusion would have made it possible at the same time to
achieve harmonisation within the Community and thereby to contribute
to the establishment and functioning of the common market. If the Com-
munity were to be recognised as having exclusive competence to enter into
agreements with non-Member countries to harmonise the protection of
intellectual property and, at the same time, to achieve harmonisation at
Community level, the Community institutions would be able to escape
the internal institutional constraints.23 The Court was therefore acutely
aware of the potential implications of the exclusivity of an external policy
on the corresponding internal policies.24 At the hearing, the Commis-
sion drew the Court’s attention to the problems which would arise if the
Community and the Member States were recognised as sharing compe-
tence to participate in the conclusion of GATS and TRIPS. It referred to
interminable discussions on competence and to the Community’s unity of
action vis-a`-vis the rest of the world being undermined and its negotiating
power greatly weakened. The Court, however, held that that concern was
‘quite legitimate’, but emphasised that any problems which might arise in
implementation of the WTO Agreement and its Annexes as regards the
co-ordination necessary to ensure unity of action where the Community
and the Member States participate jointly could not modify the answer to
22 Ibid., at [40]–[47]. 23 Ibid., at [58]–[60].
24 P. Koutrakos, ‘The Elusive Quest for Uniformity in EC External Relations’ (2001) 4 The
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 250. Cf. Cremona, n4 above, at p. 353
arguing that the Court here asserted its credentials as a constitutional court concerned to
ensure that ‘the law is observed’.
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the question of competence, that being a prior issue. Crucially, resolution
of the issue of the allocation of competence could not depend on prob-
lems which might possibly arise in administration of the agreements.25
It therefore rejected any reliance on the practical difficulties that might
arise for the Union within the WTO framework as a ground for a wider
interpretation of the CCP. It would do so again in Opinion 2/0026 and in
Opinion 1/08.27
While Opinion 1/94 was strongly criticised by quite a few
commentators,28 the Court was arguably merely performing its role as
a constitutional adjudicator and placing the CCP within the context of
the overall system of EU external relations.29 It was probably reluctant
to effect through judicial pronouncement rather than political decision-
making what it perceived to be a significant transfer of competences from
the Member States to the Community. The Court not only recognised
the Member States’ sensitivity as regards the movement of persons across
frontiers, but equally confirmed that the Treaty can only be changed by
the Member States and not by the Court.
The Court had thus displayed judicial caution in Opinion 1/94. Never-
theless, the drafters at the Amsterdam IGC decided they did not wish to
gamble over whether on a future occasion the Court might reach a differ-
ent solution based, for example, directly on the evolution of international
trade law. They took no chances and wrote the exclusion of intellectual
property and certain categories of services into Article 133(5) EC, with a
possibility for the Council to integrate them into the regular CCP, thereby
shifting the power to take into account possible evolutions in interna-
tional trade law from the Court to the Treaty drafters and, partially, to the
Council.30 Article 133(5) EC in its Amsterdam version indicated a degree
of willingness of the Member States to respond to challenges highlighted
by the Court in Opinion 1/94.31 Nonetheless, it also indicated the dis-
comfort of the Member States with the precise limits of the scope of the
CCP, in particular as regards agreements covering certain categories of
services and intellectual property rights.
25 Opinion 1/94, n17 above, at [106]–[107].
26 Opinion 2/00 [Cartagena Protocol] [2001] ECR I-9713, at [41].
27 Opinion 1/08 [GATS Schedules] [2009] ECR I- 11129, at [127].
28 Notably P. Pescatore, ‘Opinion 1/94 on the Conclusion of the WTO Agreement: Is
there an Escape from a Programmed Disaster?’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law
Review 387.
29 Koutrakos, n9 above, at pp. 47–8.
30 Cremona, n19 above, at pp. 11–13 and 18–19. 31 Koutrakos, n9 above, at p. 60.
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2.1.3 From Nice via Opinion 1/08 to Lisbon
The Member States’ unease eventually produced the rather cabalistic
amendments made to Article 133 EC by the Nice Treaty. The amendments
were again meant to take into account the evolution in international trade
as reflected in the case law of the CJEU, but they did so in a disconcertingly
cryptic manner. The Court was given the opportunity to let its light shine
on the matter in Opinion 1/08, rendered on 30 November 2009, the day
before the provisions at issue would become defunct through the enter-
ing into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The Commission had requested the
Opinion of the Court on the conclusion of agreements under GATS con-
cerning the modification and withdrawal of certain commitments and the
provision of certain compensations necessary as a result of the enlarge-
ment of the EU. The Court was consulted on whether the conclusion of
the agreements at issue with the affected WTO members fell within the
sphere of exclusive competence of the Community or within the sphere
of shared competence of the Community and the Member States and on
the appropriate legal basis for the act concluding those agreements.
In its submissions, the Commission argued that the agreements at issue
fell within the CCP and, therefore, within a sphere of Community com-
petence, which is by definition exclusive. That policy, the Commission
continued, is ‘open and dynamic’ and requires ‘constant adjustment to
take account of any changes of outlook in international relations, and
requires a non-restrictive interpretation so as not to become nugatory in
the course of time’. What about the fact that the Court had clearly held
in Opinion 1/94 that only services provided under ‘mode 1’ fell within
exclusive Community competence in commercial matters? In a rather
adventurous interpretation of Article 133 EC in its post-Nice form, the
Commission argued that the Court’s dicta in Opinion 1/94 had been
superseded in view of the changes made by the Treaty of Nice.32 In other
words, the Court did not need to adapt the scope of the CCP to the
evolution of international trade purely on its own motion: the drafters
of the Treaty of Nice had done most of the work for the Court. That
interpretation appeared rather difficult to sustain. Indeed, the Member
States in Nice had specifically moved away from the conception of the
CCP as a wholly exclusive policy by adding aspects that would clearly
fall within non-exclusive competences and by heavily circumscribing the
32 Opinion 1/08, n27 above, at [44]–[48].
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competence conferred.33 At the heart of this issue was the question
whether the participation of the Member States was necessary, which
depended, inter alia, on ‘whether, by virtue of the amendments made to
Article 133 EC by the Treaty of Nice, external Community competence
has evolved in such a way as to justify the Community alone concluding
the agreements at issue’.34
The Court did not accept the Commission’s arguments. It concluded
that the conclusion of the agreements fell within the sphere of shared
competence of the European Community and the Member States, and
that the Community act concluding those agreements had to be based on
Article 133(1), (5) and (6), second subparagraph, EC35 and on Articles
71 TEC and 80(2) EC,36 in conjunction with Article 300(2) and (3), first
subparagraph, EC. The Court made a point of explicitly affirming that it
was necessary to preserve for the Member States an effective external com-
petence in the particularly sensitive areas of culture, education and social
and human health services, in accordance with the specific provisions of
Article 133(6) EC.37
Opinion 1/08 therefore features the Court as a constitutional court will-
ing to adjudicate on the vertical division of competences,38 as it had done,
for example, in Opinion 1/94 and indeed in the first Tobacco Advertising
judgment.39 Those decisions convey the key point that Union compe-
tence in the internal market and in the CCP is subject to limitations.40
Furthermore, the Court shows its willingness to put aside considerations
of optimal unified external representation in external trade when the con-
straints thereon are imposed by the Treaties. As Advocate General Kokott
put it in her Opinion in theVietnam’sAccession to theWTO case: ‘No doubt
this legal position is not exactly conducive to the effective representation
33 Koutrakos, n9 above, at p. 71; M. Cremona, ‘Balancing Union and Member State Interests:
Opinion 1/2008, Choice of Legal Base and the Common Commercial Policy under the
Treaty of Lisbon’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 679.
34 Opinion 1/08, n27 above, at [116].
35 Article 133(1)–(4) EC contained the core exclusive parts of the CCP, while Article 133(5)–
(6) concerned the new non-exclusive aspects, i.e. trade in services and the commercial
aspects of intellectual property.
36 On transport policy. 37 Opinion 1/08, n27 above, at [139].
38 See E. Sharpston and G. De Baere, ‘The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Adjudicator’,
in A. Arnull, C. Barnard, M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds.), A Constitutional Order of
States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart
Publishing, 2011), p. 123.
39 Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419.
40 Koutrakos, n24 above, at 264.
eu external relations 253
of Community interests in the area of external trade, particularly and
precisely in the framework of the WTO. However, this disadvantage must
be accepted as the Treaties stand at present’, adding that in ‘interpreting
Treaty provisions, the Court may not exceed the limits on amending the
Treaties laid down by Article 48 EU’.41 While rather obvious, it is also a
crucial point to make if one is to understand the Court’s approach towards
the CCP.
Remarkably, none of Opinions 1/94, 2/00 or 1/08 contain a reference to
the parallelism between the CCP and the external trade policy of a State, as
Opinion 1/75 and the earlier case law had done. Has the Court abandoned
the idea of a dynamic and flexible CCP able to adapt to developments
in international trade? Arguably, it has not. The CCP’s dynamic develop-
ment requires accommodating developments in international trade and
maintaining loyalty to the EU’s constitutional principles. Effectively, the
Court has displayed judicial pragmatism, adapting principles to subse-
quent internal and external evolutions.42 Moreover, the Court’s case law
on implied external competences43 had given rise to an external relations
policy comprehensive enough for the Court to see a less pressing need
further to buttress the CCP. In Opinion 1/08, the Court showed that
it understood the Nice amendments to Article 133 EC as a reaction to
Opinion 1/94 by the creation of a set of rules different from the general
CCP system.44 If the position was to be altered, it was to be done by the
41 Opinion of AG Kokott in C-13/07Commission v.Council, removed from the register on 10
June 2010, at [124]. On the limits of what the Court can achieve through interpretation,
see also: Case C-354/04P Gestoras Pro Amnist´ıa and Others v. Council [2007] ECR I-1579,
at [50], and Case C-355/04 SEGI andOthers v. Council [2007] ECR I-1657, at [50]: ‘While a
system of legal remedies, in particular a body of rules governing non-contractual liability,
other than that established by the treaties can indeed be envisaged, it is for the Member
States, should the case arise, to reform the system currently in force in accordance with
Article 48 EU’; and, very similarly, Case C-50/00 P Unio´n de Pequen˜os Agricultores v.
Council [2002] ECR I-6677, at [45]: ‘While it is, admittedly, possible to envisage a system
of judicial review of the legality of Community measures of general application different
from that established by the founding Treaty and never amended as to its principles, it
is for the Member States, if necessary, in accordance with Article 48 EU, to reform the
system currently in force.’ More in general on the proper limits of the judicial role, see,
for example, the Opinions of Advocate General Sharpston in Joined Cases C-402/07 and
C-432/07 Sturgeon and Others [2009] ECR I-10923, at [91]–[95], and in Case C-34/09
Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000, at [171]–[173].
42 Koutrakos, n9 above, at pp. 55 and 59. 43 See below.
44 Cremona, n33 above, at 691. Cf. also M. Cremona, ‘A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The
Common Commercial Policy After Nice’ (2001) 4 The Cambridge Yearbook of European
Legal Studies 89, noting that for many commentators, the Nice redraft’s acceptance and
reflection of Opinion 1/94 constituted the fundamental flaw in its approach.
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Member States through an amendment of the Treaty and not by the
Court through interpretation of it. That is precisely what happened at
Lisbon.
Article 207 TFEU considerably expands the Union’s exclusive com-
petence in the CCP, and appears to be intended to cover essentially the
full scope45 of the WTO covered agreements.46 Not only ‘trade in goods
and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property’ are
now covered, but also ‘foreign direct investment’. Noteworthy is also the
fact that one of the (limited) categories of cases in which the Council
is to act unanimously under Article 207 TFEU, viz. for the negotiation
and conclusion of agreements ‘in the field of trade in social, education
and health services, where these agreements risk seriously disturbing the
national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility
of Member States to deliver them’,47 appears to be inspired by the Court’s
internal market case law on the relevant aspects of freedom of movement
for persons.48 It is, however, specified that the exercise of the compe-
tences within the sphere of the CCP cannot affect the delimitation of
competences between the Union and the Member States, nor will it lead
to harmonisation of the law of the Member States insofar as the Treaties
exclude such harmonisation.49
Article 3(1)(a) TFEU declares the original core of the Community, the
customs union, to be an exclusive competence of the Union. The CCP
is similarly listed among the Union’s exclusive competences in Article
3(1)(e) TFEU, which thereby codifies the Court’s settled case law on the
matter. The Treaty of Lisbon also codifies the extensive and complex case
45 With the notable exception of transport: Article 207(5) TFEU.
46 P.-C. Mu¨ller-Graff, ‘The Common Commercial Policy Enhanced by the Reform Treaty
of Lisbon?’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External
Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (Cambridge University Press, 2008),
at pp. 188–201. Further on the mutual adaptation of the EU and the WTO and the
Court’s role in that process: G. De Baere and I. Van Damme, ‘Co-adaptation in the
International Legal Order: The EU and the WTO’, in J. Crawford and S. Nouwen (eds.),
Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, Vol. 3, 2010 (Oxford and
Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2012) at pp. 311–325.
47 Art 207(4), third subparagraph, sub (b) TFEU.
48 See, for example, Case C-490/09 Commission v. Luxembourg [2011] ECR I-0000, at [43]
and the case law cited there. Cf. S. Adam and N. Lavranos, ‘Opinion 1/08 of the Court
(Grand Chamber), Schedules of specific commitments – Conclusion of agreements on the
grant of compensation for modification and withdrawal of certain commitments following
the accession of new Member States to the European Union, 30 November 2009, not yet
reported’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1538.
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law of the Court of Justice as regards implied external competences. It is
to that aspect that the present chapter now turns.
2.2 The codification of the implied external competences case law
Recognising that a strict interpretation of the Treaty would not suffice
for the attainment of the ambitious market integration goals that the
Community had set itself, the Court inferred the necessary external com-
petences from the wording of the Treaty provisions regulating internal
Community action. It did so mainly on the basis of two principles.50
First, the ERTA principle, which follows the logic of the principle of
primacy: the Member States are not allowed to act internationally in a
way that would affect existing EU law, because the situation cannot be
remedied by merely disapplying the infringing national rule. The Mem-
ber States’ competence is thus excluded, which necessitates the existence
of EU competences to compensate for the Member States’ inability to
act. Second, whenever EU law has conferred internal competences on
the institutions to attain a specific objective, the Union can enter into
the international commitments necessary for attainment of that objective
even in the absence of an express provision to that effect.51 This is the case
when the internal Union competences cannot reasonably be expected to
be effectively exercised without the possibility for the Union to enter into
international agreements with third countries on the same subject-matter.
The TFEU has attempted to codify the body of case law on the exis-
tence and the nature of implied external competence. Article 216 TFEU
provides that the Union may conclude an agreement with one or more
third countries or international organisations (1) where the Treaties so
provide or (2) where the conclusion of an agreement is ‘necessary in
order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the
objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding
Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope’. The first
part of this provision is therefore a (rather unnecessary) confirmation
of the fact that, if the Treaties provide for the possibility to conclude an
international agreement, such an agreement is indeed possible, while the
second part is a codification of the Court’s case law on the existence of
implied external competences. As a codification, it is lacking in nuance
50 See De Baere, n14 above, at pp. 16–29.
51 Opinion 1/76 [Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inlandwaterway
vessels] [1977] ECR 741, at [3].
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and does not capture the subtlety and the dynamic aspect of the Court’s
incrementally developed competence analysis.52 The same can be said of
Article 3(2) TFEU, which is intended as a codification of the Court’s case
law on the nature (exclusive or not) of implied external competences. It
provides that the Union will have exclusive competence for the conclu-
sion of an international agreement in three circumstances: (1) when its
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union; or (2) when its
conclusion is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal com-
petence; or (3) insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter
their scope.
The first of these might seem uncontroversial, but closer inspection
reveals its potentially problematic character. Does the wording mean that
any international agreement, the conclusion of which is provided for in a
legislative act of the Union, would automatically give the Union exclusive
competence for its conclusion, even if the legislative act does not provide
explicitly for this competence to be exclusive? Surely, this cannot count
in the case of an agreement pursuant to a legislative act on development
co-operation and humanitarian aid, for which the TFEU explicitly pro-
vides that the Member States should retain their competence.53 Problems
continue with the second instance of external competence, which is said
to arise when the conclusion of an international agreement is ‘neces-
sary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence’. This should
probably be considered as an attempt to codify the principles set out by
the Court in Opinion 1/76, or more precisely, the Court’s interpretation
of Opinion 1/76 in Opinion 1/94. In the latter, the Court made clear
that the external competence of the Community may become exclusive
in the extraordinary circumstance that an internal Community objective
cannot possibly be attained by simply enacting autonomous Community
rules, but necessarily has to involve third parties through an international
agreement, because the internal and external aspects of the competence
at issue are ‘inextricably linked’.54 While the phrase ‘necessary to enable
the Union to exercise its internal competence’ in Article 3(2) TFEU could
be suitably stretched to mean just that, it does seem like a rather inac-
curate rendition of the principle put forward by the Court. The CCP is
in fact an example of this principle at work. It is the external aspect of
52 P. Koutrakos, ‘Primary Law and Policy in EU External Relations: Moving Away from the
Big Picture’ (2008) 33 European Law Review 683–4; P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law,
Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 167.
53 Article 4(4) TFEU. 54 Opinion 1/94, n17 above, at [85]–[86].
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the internal market competences of the Union, which clearly belong to
the area of shared competences.55 However, one of the goals of the inter-
nal market is the removal of internal border controls and this cannot be
effectively achieved without a common external commercial policy. The
effective organisation of the latter demands the exclusive competence of
the Union and hence the exclusion of the Member States.56 The Union also
has exclusive competence to conclude an international agreement insofar
as its conclusion ‘may affect common rules or alter their scope’. That is
clearly intended as a codification of the complex ERTA case law. However,
really the only thing it achieves is to codify the core of the principle as set
out in ERTA itself, without even attempting to address the many nuances
and intricacies added by the ensuing case law.
Furthermore, the contrast between when the Union acquires exter-
nal competence under Article 216(1) TFEU and when such competence
becomes exclusive under Article 3(2) TFEU is unclear. That contrast was
also never very clear from the Court’s case law, and the drafters of the
Lisbon Treaty appear to have imported that lack of clarity into the TFEU.
Neither Article 216(1) nor Article 3(2) TFEU is in fact of much use in
clarifying ex ante the extent of the Union’s implied external competences,
because the criteria listed appear to be liable to appear contestable and
hence in need of further judicial clarification.57 Moreover, they risk intro-
ducing generalisations where none are warranted and may therefore have
unwanted ramifications on crucial competence questions. They are, at
any rate, unlikely to reduce the crucial role of the CJEU in shaping EU
external relations law in the future.58
3 Managing external competence
So far, this chapter has focused on the interactions between the judiciary
and the drafters of the Union’s primary law by examining two areas,
namely the construction of the CCP and the ways in which it has evolved
up to the Lisbon amendments laid down in Article 207 TFEU, and the
formalisation of the circumstances under which the Union enjoys exclu-
sive competence to negotiate and conclude international agreements. It
55 Article 4(2)(a) TFEU.
56 M. Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External
Action’(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 1363.
57 De Baere, n14 above, at pp. 20 and 70.
58 Koutrakos, n52 above, at 683–4; A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An
Introduction (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 207.
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shed light on the constant dialogue these developments entail, its reper-
cussions for the content and form of the Union’s external action, and the
questions which the formalisation of the outcomes of this dialogue may
raise.
The remainder of the chapter adds another perspective to this interac-
tion: it focuses on the relationship between the CJEU and the legislature
proper (that is, the bodies adopting secondary legislation) and examines
the ways in which they provide for the management of the external com-
petence of the Union, and the challenges these raise for both the Union
and the Member States. This analysis reveals threads which bring this area
together with other areas of EU external relations as well as the internal
market.
3.1 Investment policy and bilateral treaties
The area of foreign investment provides an interesting example of the
interaction between the legislature and the executive. On the one hand, in
terms of primary law, the locus of investment policy in the Union’s exter-
nal relations in general and the CCP in particular has been the subject of
controversy since the amendments of the Treaty which followed the ruling
in Opinion 1/94. Neither the limited changes introduced at Amsterdam,
nor the drastic, albeit disconcertingly convoluted, ones introduced at Nice
referred to investment.59 However, the revamped CCP set out in Article
207 TFEU refers specifically to foreign direct investment (FDI), therefore
rendering this area within the exclusive competence of the Union.60 Whilst
the reference to FDI raises questions as to the regulation of investment
policy generally in the context of EU external relations,61 the new provi-
sion of Article 207 TFEU adds a new dimension to the Union’s investment
policy.
On the other hand, the CJEU has emerged as a significant player in
the field in a series of judgments which it rendered in 2009 on the con-
sistency of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by Member
States with third countries prior to their accession to the Union. It is
59 See Cremona, n44 above, C. W. Herrmann ‘Common Commercial Policy After Nice:
Sisyphus Would Have Done a Better Job’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 7;
H. G. Krenzler and C. Pitschas, ‘Progress or Stagnation? The Common Commercial
Policy After Nice’ (2001) 6 EFA Review 291.
60 Article 3(1)(e) TFEU.
61 For instance, about portfolio investment. On the new provision, see A. Demopoulos, ‘The
Effects of the Lisbon Treaty in the Principles and Objectives of the Common Commercial
Policy’ (2010) 15 EFA Review 153.
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recalled that, under Article 351(2) TFEU, Member States ‘shall take all
appropriate measures’ to eliminate any incompatibilities between inter-
national agreements which they concluded prior to the accession to
the Union and EU law.62 In three enforcement actions brought by the
Commission, the Court ruled that the transfer clause set out in such
agreements was contrary to the freedom of the Union to impose restric-
tions on the movement of capital from a third country to the Union
under Articles 64(2), 66 and 75 TFEU.63 It, then, concluded that the fail-
ure of the three Member States to adjust this incompatibility violated
Article 351 TFEU.
These two developments suggest that the regulation of external invest-
ment policy in the post-Lisbon environment faces a dilemma: on the one
hand, the existence of exclusive competence in the CCP is at odds with
the application of agreements concluded by Member States; on the other
hand, there are more than 1,200 BITs concluded by Member States,64 and
the management of the obligations assumed by them needs careful han-
dling, not least because it is dependent on the adoption, development and
pace of the Union’s investment policy towards the countries with which
Member States have existing arrangements.
Introduced and shaped in the Union legal order by the Court, how
is the exclusive nature of the Union’s competence to be applied in an
area rendered into its scope only recently by the drafters of the Treaty,
given the policy implications of the web of existing relationships between
individual Member States and third countries? The Commission answered
this question by combining pragmatism with intense proceduralisation.
In July 2010, it adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing transitional
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States
and third countries.65 This measure sets out a Union law mechanism for
62 See J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge University Press,
2009), Chapter 6, and Koutrakos, n9 above, Chapter 8.
63 Case C-249/06 Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECR I-1335; Case C-205/06 Commission
v. Austria [2009] ECR I-1301; and Case C-118/07 Commission v. Finland [2009] ECR I-
10889. For a comment, see E. Denza, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Rules on Free
Transfer – Comment on Commission v. Austria, Commission v. Sweden, and Commission
v. Finland’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 263; and P. Koutrakos, ‘Annotation of Case
C-205/06 Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06 Commission v. Sweden (re: Bilateral
Investment Treaties)’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 2059.
64 See COM(2010)343 final, ‘Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment
Policy’ (Brussels, 7 July 2010), at p. 4.
65 COM(2010)344 final, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements
between Member States and Third Countries’ (Brussels, 7 July 2010).
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the maintenance in force and amendment of existing, as well as the
negotiation and conclusion of new, BITs.
The main rationale for the proposal is that the shaping of the Union’s
foreign investment policy is an incremental process which could not hap-
pen overnight. As the existing BITs concluded by Member States grant
investor rights, it is essential that legal certainty is provided as to the status
of these rights – indeed, legal certainty is a constant in the Commission’s
document. Therefore, the proposal is pragmatic in its approach. This is
also illustrated by a document adopted by the Commission on the same
day, setting out the main parameters within which the Commission envis-
ages the development of the Union’s international investment policy.66 In
this document, the Commission views this development as ‘gradual and
targeted’.67
The thrust of the proposal is the achievement of the above objective
pursuant to a procedural framework controlled by the Commission itself
which considers its role as an illustration of its responsibilities as the
guardian of the Treaty. This revolves around two procedures dealing with
the authorisation of existing agreements, as well as the amendment of
existing or the conclusion of new agreements respectively. The authori-
sation of existing BITs would be granted following their notification by
all the Member States to the Commission. Such authorisation would be
granted notwithstanding the Union’s competence in the area, and with-
out prejudice to other EU law obligations of the Member States. The
Commission would review the agreements in order to assess whether
they are compatible with EU law, they overlap with an agreement which
the Union concluded with the third countries concerned or they consti-
tute an obstacle to the development and implementation of the Union’s
investment policies. These would also constitute grounds for withdrawal
of an authorisation by the Commission.
As for the authorisation to amend existing or conclude new BITs, this
would follow a notification by the Member State concerned (covering
the provisions to be addressed in the negotiations, the objectives of the
negotiations and any other relevant information) at least five months
prior to the commencement of the negotiations. This information would
be disseminated, then, to the other Member States, and, within three
months, the Commission would ascertain whether the authorisation to
open formal negotiations would be granted. Such an assessment would
66 ‘Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy’, n64 above.
67 Ibid., p. 2.
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depend on whether the opening of negotiations would be in conflict
with EU law, undermine the objectives of negotiations between the EU
and the third country concerned, or would constitute an obstacle to the
development and implementation of the Union’s investment policies.
The Commission’s proposal is noteworthy for the considerable inten-
sity and scope of the interaction between Member States and the Com-
mission. It refers not only to the opening of negotiations, and the signing
and conclusion of BITs, but also the application of such agreements. In
relation to the first two, separate authorisations would be required, each
of which would depend on two separate assessments pursuant to the
information provided by the notifying Member State. In the process of
the negotiation of a BIT, the Commission could require the Member State
to include any appropriate clauses, and could request to participate in the
negotiations. As for the application of the agreement, the Commission
proposes specific obligations on Member States. For instance, it would be
kept informed without undue delay of all meetings under existing BITs
and would be entitled to require that the Member State concerned take
a particular position. Similarly, any dispute which might arise about the
application of a BIT would have to be notified to the Commission which
may even go as far as to require that it participate in any settlement pro-
cedure. Its agreement would also be required prior to the activation of
any dispute settlement mechanisms included in the BIT by the Member
State concerned.
Rather than reserving for itself the role of a distant and neutral assessor,
the Commission enables itself to be quite intrusive in all phases of the
negotiation, conclusion and application of BITs concluded by Member
States. Any assessment of this proposal should take into account its very
specific context, that is the exercise of an exclusive competence bestowed
upon the Union on 1 December 2009, which the latter is not in a position
to exercise immediately. Therefore, the proposal sets out a Union law
framework within which the Member States are expected to carry out their
external investment policy as a matter of Union law, as their competence
has been superseded by that of the Union. Viewed from this angle, the
apparently intrusive powers by the Commission merely define the ways
in which the Member States are to use a competence to which they can
no longer lay any claim.
The Commission’s proposals have not been met with enthusiasm by
either the Member States or the European Parliament. The former argue
that the right of the Commission to withdraw an authorisation under-
mines legal certainty. The latter objects to the absence of any time limit for
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the existence of BITs pending the development of the EU investment pol-
icy. This is seen as enabling the emergence of parallel investment regimes
which would undermine the very objective of the authorisation system,
namely legal certainty. To that effect, the Parliament suggests an eight-year
time line for the agreements, following which all should be replaced by
Union agreements, and a shorter deadline for the Commission to report
on the application of the proposed Regulation.68 In addition, references
to the temporary nature of the arrangement are scattered throughout the
amendments suggested by the Parliament. There are two other interesting
features in the Parliament’s amendments. On the one hand, it suggests an
obligation of the Commission to report annually to the Parliament and
the Council on the application of the proposed Regulation. On the other
hand, it places greater emphasis on the participation of the Commission
in the dispute settlement procedures which may be relied upon in the
context of BITs, as the rulings of any international arbitration tribunals
could have a decisive impact on the development of the Union’s own
investment policy.
3.2 Other cases of proceduralisation in EU external relations
The emergence of an EU procedural framework within which Member
States are expected to act on the international scene is not a novelty
associated with investment policy. Two other examples are noteworthy.
The first is in the area of international aviation where the interaction
between the judiciary and the legislature is both direct and striking. In
2002, the Court rendered a series of judgments on the legality of Open
Skies Agreements concluded by Member States with the United States.69
An analysis of these judgments is beyond the scope of this chapter.70
Suffice it to recall that the Court held that only in certain areas did the
68 See Doc. 2010/0197(COD) ‘Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral
Investment Agreements between Member States and Third Countries’ (18 November
2010).
69 Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519; Case C-468/98 Commission
v. Sweden [2002] ECR I-9575; Case C-469/98 Commission v. Finland [2002] ECR I-9627;
Case C-471/98 Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-9681; Case C-472/98 Commission
v. Luxembourg [2002] ECR I-9741; Case C-475/98 Commission v. Austria [2002] ECR
I-9797; Case C-476/98 Commission v. Germany [2002] ECR I-9855. In addition, the
Court ruled in Case C-466/98 Commission v. UK [2002] ECR I-9427. Its conclusions were
reaffirmed in Case C-523/04 Commission v. Netherlands [2007] ECR I-3267.
70 See Eeckhout, n4 above, at pp. 101–108; Koutrakos, n9 above, at pp. 117–28.
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Union have exclusive competence to conclude such agreement. Therefore,
in other areas covered by Open Skies Agreements, the Member States still
had competence which they shared with the Union.
The Commission welcomed this line of judgments,71 and was given a
mandate to negotiate an agreement with the United States on behalf of
the Union.72 As for the Council, it adopted Regulation 847/2004/EC on
the negotiation and implementation of air services agreements between
Member States and third countries.73 Based on ex-Article 80(2) EC (now
Article 100(2) TFEU), this measure establishes a system of co-operation
between the Commission and Member States aiming at the co-ordination
of negotiations with third countries, the achievement of a harmonised
approach in the implementation and application of air services agree-
ments and the verification of their compliance with Union law.
Regulation 847/2007 aims to address a problem which is distinct from
that tackled by the Commission’s proposal on BITs concluded by Member
States examined above. The latter authorise the Member States to act
in areas where they have ceased to enjoy any competence; the former
authorises the Member States to act in areas where their competence may
coincide partly with that of the Union.74 Therefore, Regulation 847/2004
aims to ensure that the Union’s external action would not be undermined
by unilateral Member State action, whilst the Commission’s proposal
on BITs aims to ensure legal certainty for investors protected by BITs
concluded by Member States pending an assessment by the Union as to
how best to carry out its investment policy.
Regulation 847/2004 sets out a framework of interaction between the
Commission and the Member State negotiating an air services agreement.
This consists of the imposition of substantive and procedural duties. In
71 See COM(2002)649 final, ‘Communication from the Commission on the Consequences
of the Court Judgements of 5 November 2002 for European Air Transport Policy.’ (Brus-
sels, 19 November 2002). It was indicative of the significance of these rulings that the
Commission should have responded with such speed in order to set out its understanding
of their impact. Another case in relation to which it had responded in a similar manner
was Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649: ‘Communication from the Commis-
sion concerning the consequences of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on
20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (“Cassis de Dijon”)’ OJ 1980 C256/2.
72 For the text of the agreement, see OJ 2007 L134/4. 73 OJ 2004 L157/7.
74 Following the judgments, the Commission has also argued that the Union’s exclusive
competence also extends to a range of other issues, which may be addressed in bilat-
eral air services agreements, including safety issues, commercial opportunities, customs
duties, taxes and (user) charges, restrictions on aircraft for environmental reasons: ‘Com-
munication from the Commission on the Consequences of the Court Judgements of
5 November 2002 for European Air Transport Policy’, n71 above, at pp. 7–8.
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terms of substantive duties, Member States must include in their nego-
tiations any relevant standard clauses, developed and laid down jointly
between Member States and the Commission (Article 1(1)). Furthermore,
Regulation 847/2004 sets out a prohibition on the introduction of more
restrictive arrangements regarding the number of Union air carriers des-
ignated to provide services,75 and imposes a duty of non-discriminatory
and transparent distribution of traffic rights should these, or the number
of Union air carriers eligible to be designated to take advantage of them,
be limited.76
In terms of procedural duties, a Member State must notify its inten-
tion to enter into negotiations to the Commission at least one calendar
month prior to the commencement of formal negotiations (or, due to
exceptional circumstances, as soon as possible) (Article 1(2)). The Com-
mission, then, makes the notification (and, on request, the accompanying
documentation) available to the other Member States, which may make
comments to the notifying Member State. The Commission, then, has
fifteen (15) days to approach the Member State in cases where it con-
cludes that the negotiations ‘are likely to undermine the objectives of
Community negotiations underway with the third country concerned,
and/or lead to an agreement which is incompatible with Community law’
(Article 1(4)).
There is another procedural duty imposed on Member States, namely to
notify the Commission of the outcome of the negotiations upon signature
of an agreement. Furthermore, in cases where an agreement does limit the
use of traffic rights or the number of Union air carriers to be designated
to take advantage of traffic rights, the relevant Member State must inform
the Commission without delay of the procedures which it shall apply
in order to ensure the non-discriminatory distribution of traffic rights
(Article 6).77 These procedures are published by the Commission in the
Official Journal.78
75 In accordance with Article 3, a ‘Member State shall not enter into any new arrangement
with a third country, which reduces the number of Community air carriers which may,
in accordance with existing arrangements, be designated to provide services between its
territory and that country, neither in respect of the entire air transport market between
the two parties nor on the basis of specific city pairs’.
76 Article 5.
77 The same applies to any new procedures and subsequent changes to existing procedures
which must be communicated to the Commission at least eight weeks prior to their entry
into force (Article 6).
78 For a recent example, see Cypriot national procedure for the allocation of limited air
traffic rights, OJ 2009 C56/08.
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The nature of the duties which Regulation 847/2004 imposes on Mem-
ber States and the language in which these are couched are noteworthy.
A Member State may not enter into negotiations unless it has agreed
to include any relevant standard clauses. Indeed, once these have been
incorporated in the agreement, that Member State ‘shall be authorised’ to
conclude it, ‘provided that this does not harm the object and purpose of
the Community transport policy’ (Article 4(2)).79 Furthermore, the pro-
cedural duties are couched in unequivocal terms – indeed, the Member
State concerned ‘shall take’ comments made by other Member States into
account ‘as far as possible in the course of the negotiations’.
And yet, it is not entirely easy to gauge either the precise scope of the
obligations imposed on the Member States or the specific repercussions
from the conduct of the individual actors. For instance, in cases where the
Commission concludes that the negotiations are likely to undermine the
objectives of the Union negotiations under way with a third country or
lead to incompatibilities with Union law, Article 1(4) merely states that
the Commission ‘shall inform the Member State accordingly’. One would
assume that the Member State would, then, have to make the necessary
inferences and amend its negotiating strategy in order to achieve the
incorporation of the relevant clauses. However, even if such clauses did
not find their way into the agreement, the Member State could still be
authorised to conclude it ‘provided that this does not harm the object and
purpose of the Community transport policy’ (Article 4(2)). This seems
to suggest that non-incorporation of the relevant clauses does not in itself
run counter to the Union’s transport policy.
Their different objectives and subject-matter notwithstanding, Regu-
lation 847/2004 and the Commission’s proposal on the authorisation of
BITs concluded by Member States have a number of features in common.
First, both aim to achieve their different objectives by setting out rules
and procedures which are based on the constant interaction between the
Commission and the national authorities of individual Member States
(and, in certain cases, the authorities of the other Member States too).
Second, they constitute the response of the Union’s legislature to the
assessment of the CJEU as to how competence should be distributed
in the Union’s constitutional order. As this chapter has highlighted, the
above provisions constitute the product of a continuous dialogue between
79 Article 4(3). Such authorisation is to be granted pursuant to Articles 3 and 7 of Deci-
sion 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers
conferred on the Commission, OJ 1999 L184/23.
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the Union’s judges and the drafters of primary and secondary rules. For
instance, a chain of developments is worth recalling: the ruling in Opinion
1/94 relies repeatedly upon the limits of the Community’s competence
set out in primary law; the last three constitutional amendments of the
CCP clearly draw upon this and the subsequent rulings of the Court;
Opinion 1/08 responds to the new environment shaped by the hapless
Nice amendment; and, finally, the Commission’s 2010 proposals seek to
reconcile the Lisbon amendment of the CCP and the rulings of the Court
on the Austrian, Swedish and Finnish BITs with the reality of the web of
such agreements.
Third, both sets of rules and procedures draw upon the duty of co-
operation. Regulation 847/2004, for instance, states in its Preamble that
‘[i]t is essential to ensure that a Member State conducting negotiations
takes account of Community law, broader Community interests and
ongoing Community negotiations’.80 Similarly, the Commission’s 2010
proposals on BITs suggest that any authorisation to open formal negoti-
ations and then to sign and conclude an agreement would depend on an
assessment of, amongst other things, whether such an agreement would
undermine the objectives of negotiations under way or imminent between
the Union and the third country concerned. Such provisions are hardly
surprising, as failure by a Member State to take into account a mandate
for the Commission to negotiate on international agreement had already
been held by the Court to be contrary to the duty of co-operation.81
There is another area in EU external relations where the Union leg-
islature has responded to the Court’s case law by setting out a Union
procedural framework within which national action may be authorised.
This is the area of civil justice where two measures were adopted in
2009. The first measure is Regulation 662/2009 dealing with agreements
concluded by Member States on particular matters concerning the law
applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations.82 The second
measure is Regulation 664/2009 on agreements concluded by Member
States on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments and
decisions in matrimonial matters, parental responsibility and applicable
law in matters relating to maintenance obligations.83
80 Recital 8.
81 See Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805 and Case C-433/03
Commission v. Germany [2005] ECR I-6985.
82 OJ 2009 L200/25. 83 OJ 2009 L200/46.
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The origin of both measures is the ruling of the Court in Opinion
1/03 where it was held that the Union had exclusive competence on
matters affecting rules set out in the Brussels I Regulation, in particu-
lar regarding jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters.84 In other words, this is a case
of a competence which has been deemed to be enjoyed by the Union
exclusively, and yet Member States are authorised to act in specific cases
as the Union has not exercised its competence. Therefore, the rationale
for the introduction of a Union law procedural framework in this case
is similar to that underpinning the Commission’s proposal on BITs con-
cluded by Member States, except that, in the former case, what triggered
the adoption of Regulations 662/2009 and 664/2009 was solely a ruling
of the CJEU.
The provisions set out in the above Regulations are noteworthy for
their strong wording and the set of tight obligations they impose on the
Member States. Indeed, the whole procedure is couched in terms of ‘an
application’ to negotiation to be submitted by a Member State wishing to
negotiate with a third country. If the Commission concludes that there
are obstacles to the agreement, the Member State is not authorised to
open negotiations with the third country. Again, there is a notification
procedure which should be relied upon by the Member State at least
three months before formal negotiations are scheduled to commence,
and which would give the Commission six months to decide.
Regulations 662/2009 and 664/2009 provide that the Commission ‘shall
assess whether the Member State may open formal negotiations’.85 In the
presence of a Union agreement in the area, the application is rejected
automatically. In the absence of such an agreement, the Commission
would check whether any relevant Union agreement with the third coun-
try concerned is expected in the near future. If this is not the case, the
Commission may grant the authorisation, provided that two conditions
are met: on the one hand, the Member State concerned establishes a spe-
cific interest in the conclusion of the bilateral sectoral agreement with
the third country, related in particular to the existence of economic, geo-
graphical, cultural or historical ties between the Member State and that
third country; on the other hand, the agreement does not render Union
84 Opinion 1/03 [re: Lugano Convention] [2006] ECR I-1145.
85 Article 4(1) of Regulation 662/2009, n82 above, and Article 4(1) of Regulation 664/2009,
n83 above.
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law ineffective and does not undermine the proper functioning of the
system established by that law, neither does it undermine the object and
purpose of the Union’s external relations policy.
And even in cases where an authorisation is granted, the Commission
maintains the right to propose negotiating guidelines and request the
inclusion of particular clauses in the proposed agreement. The agreement
would also need to include a denunciation clause which the Member State
would invoke when the EC concludes an agreement with the third country
in question on the same subject-matters of civil justice. Furthermore,
the Commission is given the right to participate as an observer in the
negotiations between the Member State and the third country and, in the
alternative, to be kept informed of the progress and results throughout
the different stages of negotiations.
3.3 Different points of departure, common features
The above sections have offered an overview of different legislative
responses to the dialogue between the Union’s judges and the legislature
in the area of EU external relations. All are about setting out a procedu-
ral framework which would manage the repercussions of this dialogue
by establishing channels of communication between the Member States
and the Union’s executive. These responses deal with different cases: they
authorise the Member States to act in cases where they have ceased to
enjoy any competence pursuant to an amendment of primary law (Com-
mission’s 2010 proposals on BITs); they authorise the Member States to
act in areas where their competence may coincide partly with that of the
Union (Regulation 847/2004 on air services agreements); they authorise
the Member States to act in areas where their competence has been super-
seded by the Union, but where the latter has not acted yet (Regulations
662/2009 and 664/2009).
The different circumstances under which these frameworks come about
have an impact on their content. For instance, the set of procedures set
out in the area of civil justice is considerably tighter than that set out
in the area of air services. However, this is explained by the exceptional
nature of any national action in areas where the Union is endowed with
exclusive competence. Therefore, this procedure enables the Commission
to manage the exercise of Union competence through the medium of
Member States whilst considering whether it would be more expedient
for that competence to be exercised by the Union itself.
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However, the different contexts and intensity of obligations notwith-
standing, these measures have a number of features in common. First,
the starting point for these arrangements is pragmatism. It is accepted,
for instance, that international aviation has been traditionally governed
by bilateral agreements between Member States and third countries; it
is also accepted that any agreements in the area would cover issues of
both national and Union competence: the question, then, is how to deal
with these facts whilst seeking to ensure the Union interest. The same
consideration applies to the rights granted to international investors by
means of Treaties between States. There is another aspect of pragma-
tism which underlies these arrangements: in addition to the reality of
the existence of agreements concluded by the Member States, the Union
institutions acknowledge that the emergence of exclusivity either pur-
suant to Treaty amendment (in the area of investment) or a judicial
pronouncement (in the areas of international aviation and civil justice)
by no means gives rise to a Union policy. The latter requires a period
of reflection during which the Union institutions are to assess a number
of economic, political and legal considerations and interact with various
actors which pursue different, often conflicting, interests. It is this leap
between the emergence of competence and the development of policy
which the above arrangements seek to manage by striking the balance
between maintaining the status quo whilst ensuring that the Union’s
interest to determine how best to exercise its own competence would not
be undermined.
Second, whilst constituting a specific example of what the duty of loyal
co-operation entails in the area of EU external relations, the procedural
model set out in this chapter is by no means unique to this area. In the
area of internal market law, for instance, one recalls the system set out
in Directive 83/189 on technical specifications.86 This measure imposes
a notification duty on Member States envisaging introducing rules on
86 OJ 1983 L109/8, replaced by Directive 98/34 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the
field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on information society services,
OJ 1998 L 204/37. This applies to technical specifications, that is ‘a specification contained
in a document which lays down the characteristics required of a product such as levels
of quality, performance, safety or dimensions, including the requirements applicable to
the product as regards the name under which the product is sold, terminology, symbols,
testing and test methods, packaging, marking or labeling and conformity assessment
procedures’. For an analysis, see S. Weatherill, ‘Compulsory Notification of Draft Technical
Regulations: The Contribution of Directive 83/189 to the Management of the Internal
Market’ (1996) 16 Yearbook of European Law 129.
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technical specifications, as well as a standstill duty, pending an assessment
by the Commission as to whether the envisaged measures are compat-
ible with EU law. The objective of this system is to set up a preventive
control mechanism aiming to ensure free movement of goods whilst also
enabling the Commission to ascertain whether it might be necessary
or desirable for a Union measure to be promulgated in order to deal
with the subject-matter of the envisaged national measure.87 Therefore,
achievement of free movement of goods is envisaged pursuant to a system
which would provide for both ex ante control (on the basis of the pro-
cedural framework set out in Directive 83/189) and ex post control (on
the basis of enforcement of the relevant Union rules by national courts
and the CJEU). Therefore, it appears that the management of both the
EU external relations and the internal market may entail recourse to a
heavily proceduralised set of rules in order to ensure that, in the consti-
tutionally idiosyncratic Union legal order, often disparate policy needs
are addressed within a unified framework which relies upon the con-
stant interaction between its institutions as well as them and the Member
States.
This parallel raises the question of the role of the CJEU and its response
to the management of the proceduralisation chosen by the Union’s leg-
islature. It is recalled that, in the context of technical standards, the role
of the Court has been crucial: not only has it ruled that a violation of
either the notification requirement or the standstill clause would ren-
der the national measure inapplicable, but it has also accepted that these
consequences could be invoked in disputes between individuals before
national courts.88 In doing so, it has enhanced the effectiveness of the
regime considerably. In the context of the procedural framework adopted
in EU external relations and outlined in this chapter, on the other hand,
there has been no case law. Whilst any temptation to conjecture should
be resisted, it is worth recalling not only that the Court has assumed a
central role in the genesis and development of the whole corpus of EU
external relations case law, but also that it has proved rather rigorous in
the last few years in spelling out and enforcing the implications of the
87 See Case C-194/94 CIA Security v. Signalson [1996] ECR I-2201 (annotated by J. Cappel,
‘Horizontal Direct Effect of Directives’ (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 69 and P. J. Slot,
‘Case C-194/94: CIA Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRLs’ (1996)
33 Common Market Law Review 1035); and Case C-443/98 Unilever Italia SpA v. Central
Food SpA [2000] ECR I-7535, annotated by S. Weatherill, ‘Breach of Directives and Breach
of Contract’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 177.
88 See CIA Security, n87 above, and Unilever, n87 above.
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duty of co-operation which binds the Member States, as well as the EU
institutions, in the context of the Union’s external relations.89
Third, the arrangements set out in this chapter do not draw dogmatic
conclusions as to the implications of the existence of the Union’s exclusive
competence. Instead, they focus on the practice of external relations and
the choices which need to be made in the light of the specific policy context
set in different areas of activity. This bottom-up approach is a refreshing
antidote to the tiresome disputes between the Union institutions about
allocation of competence.90 By disentangling the question of competence
from that of its exercise, the Union channels its energy to enabling itself to
address specific policy imperatives on the basis of practical and mutually
acceptable arrangements. In fact, the arrangements in the area of BITs
and civil justice go even further, as they rely upon Member States for
the exercise of a Union competence, hence rendering them trustees of
the Union interest.91 In principle, this is not novel, as objective reasons,
such as the constitutive document of international organisations, which
confine membership to States, may prevent the Union from exercising
its competence, in which case this is exercised through the medium of
Member States as a matter of EU law.92 However, the arrangements dis-
cussed in this chapter illustrate a choice which the Union institutions
have made. It is a sign of maturity that the Union legal order should
develop mechanisms to rely upon its coexistence with the Member States,
and manage it in order to further the Union interest, the existence of
its competence notwithstanding. This would also enable the Union and
the Member States to focus on substantive issues about policy, rather
than theological debates about competence. In this respect, it is notewor-
thy that, in the area of international investment policy, the Commission
points out the active role of the Member States in promoting inward
89 See Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland (re: Mox Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635;
Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805; Case C-246/07 Com-
mission v. Sweden (re: PFOs) [2010] ECR I-3317.
90 See P. Koutrakos, ‘Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU External Rela-
tions’, in M. Cremona and B. De Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional
Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 171.
91 See M. Cremona, ‘Member States as Trustees of the Union Interest: Participating in
International Agreements on Behalf of the European Union’, in A. Arnull, C. Barnard, M.
Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States: Essays in European Law
in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Pubishing, 2011), p. 435.
92 See Opinion 2/91 [Convention No. 170 ILO on safety in the use of chemicals at work] [1993]
ECR I-1061, at [5]; and Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece (re: International Maritime
Convention) [2009] ECR I-1701, at [31].
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and outward investment, and points out that ‘while it is the Union’s
responsibility to promote the European model and the single market as a
destination for foreign investors . . . it seems neither feasible nor desirable
to replace the investment promotion efforts of Member States, as long as
they fit with the common commercial policy and remain consistent with
EU law’.93
4 Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of the dialogue between the judiciary
and the legislature in the area of external relations. This dialogue has
been broad in scope, involving both the drafters of primary law and the
institutions adopting secondary rules, and steady in its intensity. It has
also been constant, lasting from the early 1970s when the Court started
shaping the contours of the Union’s external action to the current date
when Lisbon provisions draw directly upon much discussed judgments.
What emerges from this dialogue is a relationship which is less antag-
onistic than one might assume.94 The example of the CCP is a case in
point, as it illustrates a genuine legal debate over the correct construc-
tion of the emerging policy. This characteristic may be explained not
only in the light of the essential role of the Court in the genesis of the
Union’s external relations, but also the pragmatism which this institution
has exhibited over the years in its efforts to define the contours of
the Union’s competence in the light of the idiosyncratic constitutional
arrangements set out in the Treaties. As relationships are about osmosis,
this chapter suggested that pragmatism was not confined to the Court’s
case law, but also informed the legislature’s approach to the practical
implications of the emergence of the Union’s exclusive competence and
its readiness to rely upon the Member States in the exercise of this com-
petence, albeit within a clearly set out procedural framework.
93 COM(2010)343 final, ‘Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment
Policy’ (Brussels, 7 July 2010), at p. 6.
94 As it arguably was as regards the ‘Danish second home protocol’ (now Protocol No. 32 on
the Acquisition of Property in Denmark, OJ 2010 C83/318), the ‘Barber protocol’ (now
Protocol No. 33 concerning Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, OJ 2010 C83/319) and the ‘Grogan protocol’ (now Protocol No. 35 on Article
40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland, OJ 2010 C83/321), on which see D. Curtin, ‘The
Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 30 Common
Market Law Review 46–52; and specifically on the Barber protocol: Alter, n2 above, at
pp. 128–9.
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However, osmosis in itself by no means guarantees success. The quality
of the outcomes of the interactions between the judiciary and the leg-
islature is undermined in cases where the fundamentally distinct roles
of these institutions are not being taken into account. This is illustrated in
the area of the Union’s implied competences, where the attempt to codify
the Court’s pronouncements in primary law fails to convey the subtleties
of principles developed over decades of incrementally growing case law.
The Court is therefore now faced with the task of interpreting a Treaty text
that is in fact a slightly blurred image of its own earlier case law. It remains
to be seen whether this interpretation by the Court of an interpretation
by the Treaty drafters of the Court’s evolving interpretation in its case law
of Treaty language will be any different from that existing case law.
It is telling that this chapter, and the story of the dialogue between
the judiciary and the legislature which it has told, should finish where
it started, namely the role of the CJEU. To point out the pivotal role of
Europe’s judges to the development of Union law is a truism bordering
on banality. However, the central role of the CJEU in the area of external
relations has not been affected by the intensity of the legislature’s inter-
vention. If anything, Europe’s judges continue to have a profound impact
on every step of the development of the Union’s external action. And the
Lisbon Treaty will by no means change this.
